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# REVIEW OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL FUNCTIONING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Note by the Secretary-General

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 48/218 B of 29 July 1994, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit, for the attention of the General Assembly, the attached report, conveyed to him by the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, on the review of the Field Administration and Logistics Division, Department of Peace-keeping Operations. The Secretary-General is in agreement with the recommendations contained in the report. With regard to the delegation of authority in the purchase of communications equipment for peace-keeping operations, the Secretary-General has asked that this matter be further studied.

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ANNEX

Review of the Field Administration and Logistics Division, Department of Peace-keeping Operations

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

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# I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 49/233 of 23 December 1994, the Office of Internal Oversight Services was called upon to undertake an inspection of the units within the Secretariat responsible for logistical, operational and administrative arrangements in peace-keeping and other field operations, with a view to identifying problems and recommending measures to enhance the efficient utilization of resources. In response, the Office of Internal Oversight Services established the terms of reference for the review which identified the Field Administration and Logistics Division, within the Office of Planning and Support of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, as the primary target of this effort, and noted that attention would also be given, as appropriate, to the various intra- and inter-departmental links and dependencies that affected the operational activities of the Division.

2. Over the years the organizational unit responsible for activities relating to field and peace-keeping operations support had been relocated in several organizational entities within the Organization. It was situated, as of 1 September 1993, in the Department and was governed by the mandate set out in the Secretary-General's Bulletin (ST/SGB/Organization) of 22 March 1995. As stated therein, the basic mandate for this Division is to provide "administrative and logistic support to the Organization's peace-keeping and other field missions" and in this respect, to identify "in cooperation with the Mission Planning Service, administrative and logistic requirements of field missions, including administrative support, staffing tables, accommodation, transport, communications, equipment and supplies".

3. In order to fully understand the nature of the problems which needed to be addressed, the activities undertaken by the various sections and units within the Division were reviewed from workflow and control points of view. a/ Accordingly, extensive interviews of staff at various levels were conducted and a thorough review of available documents was made. The findings revealed several problems common to many units and helped identify a number of vulnerable areas.

4. In general, the team noted that while the Division had many hard-working and dedicated staff, it did not function in an environment that (a) facilitated operational efficiency; (b) was conducive to effective internal controls; or (c) promoted effective resource management. Although part of this was clearly internal to the Division, part of this was also due to external factors that had constrained operational capacity. With regard to personnel, the findings suggested that the Division's complement of staff was inappropriate in mix and, in some respects, insufficient in numbers. They also suggested that some functional responsibilities were not entirely clear, and that certain organizational linkages had clouded accountability and impeded efficiency. Finally, from a financial point of view, the team found that the Organization (a) faced a potential risk in the form of unrecorded liabilities; (b) was potentially wasting considerable sums of money owing to, inter alia, the lack of adequate asset controls; and (c) faced potential risk in terms of third-party liability because of uncertain insurance coverage in cases where troops were deployed/rotated under letters of assist.

5. In the light of the above, the team could not escape the conclusion that the Division did not have the capacity to discharge adequately the responsibilities vested in it by the Secretary-General's Bulletin (ST/SGB/Organization) of 22 March 1995 - either managerially or organizationally. Unless certain fundamental issues were resolved, the likelihood of alleviating this capacity problem was small.

6. It should be stressed that the concern with the Division's capacity was as much qualitative as it was financial. This meant that while there may have been a need for additional resources in some respects, the provision of these alone would not provide the necessary reasonable assurances to the Secretary-General and to the various legislative bodies that administrative and logistical support for peace-keeping operations would be effectively and efficiently provided. Given the pace at which peace-keeping activities have evolved over the past few years, it was imperative that sound measures be promptly put into place so as to (a) ensure that resources were properly managed; and (b) provide the institutional depth/memory needed as the Organization confronted a number of new or expanded peace-keeping operations.

7. Therefore, one of the team's primary recommendations was that Division/Department management take appropriate steps to address the operational, organizational, and control weaknesses noted in the present report, and in particular, as they relate to (a) staff responsibilities and accountability; (b) mission planning and preparation; (c) systems development and support; and (d) asset management and control. In addition, immediate steps should be taken to determine the extent of the Organization's financial obligations regarding potential claims from troop-contributing countries, and to address the issue of appropriate insurance coverage. With regard to the issues of asset control and inappropriate/inadequate insurance coverage, the team was of the opinion that a second review may be necessary to investigate the extent of these problems and to assess the adequacy of the measures employed to protect the Organization's resources.

8. From a resource point of view, it was recommended that Division/Department management reassess the Division's organizational structure with a view to identifying the inadequate complement and mix of staff needed to undertake clearly delineated responsibilities. It was also recommended that additional resources be authorized by the General Assembly from the support account in order to address those areas where the potential financial risk to the United Nations was greatest. Finally, the team recommended that the Secretariat and Member States undertake a serious review of the methodology used to calculate the level of resources authorized under the support account in order to assess whether the current formula of a flat percentage rate yielded a result appropriate to the workload involved, given the expanding role of the Organization in peace-keeping operations.

## II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

9. The findings and conclusions have been grouped under four main categories of issues: organizational, management, control and legislative. They are summarized in table 1. A detailed discussion of each category of issues together with an overall conclusion follows.

Table 1. Four main categories of issues

| Category | Findings | Conclusions |
|---|---|---|
| (a) Organizational issues | (1) Division's staffing mix reflects a disproportionate number of short-term and military personnel.<br>(2) Many Division posts have not yet been officially classified.<br>(3) A large number of staff do not have written job descriptions.<br>(4) The Division is too compartmentalized and is fragmented with respect to certain responsibilities.<br>(5) The Division is bound by certain United Nations Financial Regulations/ Rules and interdepartmental procedures that have impeded efficiency. | The Division's organizational structure does not promote operational efficiency and effectiveness, and in some respects is constrained by organizational linkages. |
| (b) Management issues | (1) Some Division staff are uncertain as to whom and for what they are accountable.<br>(2) Some Division staff have assumed de facto autonomy and therefore have "self-determined" authority.<br>(3) The Divisions's computer systems development-related practices lack adequate oversight. | The Division's management has not provided sufficient guidance on accountability, responsibility, measures of performance, and efficient operating practices. |
| (c) Control issues | (1) Claims exist for aircraft usage and contingent-owned equipment which have not yet been obligated - the total of which is not yet known.<br>(2) The Division does not have a world-wide inventory of assets, and cannot, inter alia, effectively relate asset ownership to procurement decisions. | The Division's control environment has not provided adequate safeguards for controlling resources and, as a result, the Organization remains subject to considerable financial risk. |
| (d) Legislative issues | (1) Division resources are "capped" using a percentage that ignores any fluctuation in military forces. | The current methodology used to calculate support account resources is inappropriate. |

Organizational issues

10. The tables in annexes I and II explain the analysis pertaining to the staffing issues and illustrate why the mix and complement of staff within the Division, along with its somewhat compartmentalized structure, are not conducive to efficient and effective management. In examining the entire staffing issue, however, it is important to keep in mind that peace-keeping support operations are subject to constant change, and time is a critical factor, which in no way can be compared to more "stable" operations within the Organization. This rapid pace, together with the strain that it can place on staff has been given consideration in formulating the conclusions and recommendations contained herein.

11. In terms of actual staffing, the figures in annex I indicate that the majority (157 out of 177 staff, or 89 per cent) were against posts financed from the support account (137 posts from the support account and 20 posts from general temporary assistance from within the support account). Of these, 103 were on fixed- or short-term contracts, with 50 of these, or 49 per cent, on contracts of less than 11 months in duration. With respect to military officers on loan from Member States, these represented approximately 19 per cent of the entire Division staff, with the majority in the Logistics and Communications Service. The duration of a typical military "tour" has varied, with officers staying for one, two or in exceptional cases, three years, depending on the Member State and on individual circumstances.

12. It is interesting to note, however, that while the military personnel within the Division were not under United Nations contracts, nor encumbering posts, there were 23 military officers in other parts of the Department who had received fixed-term appointments. In these cases, the team was led to understand that the Department's senior management decided which posts required such military appointments, then solicited candidates through channels within the various permanent missions. Once an officer was selected, he/she temporarily left the service of his/her Government to work in the Department for a two-year period, usually beginning with a one-year fixed-term contract, followed by a routine renewal for a second year - unless denied as a result of poor performance. In this regard, it should be emphasized that unlike Division civilian contract staff, no military officer was offered a United Nations fixed-term appointment for less than one year.

13. Given this prevailing mix, the team was of the opinion that the Division's complement of staff was rather lopsided. Some of the problems associated with such a mix included a lack of institutional memory, the need to constantly retrain and reorient new staff, an inability to retain qualified personnel and poor job stability. For its part, the Division played no role in the technical reviews/interviews of propcsed candidates, and had no ability to reject loaned officers, and may at times have required especially long-learning curves because of gaps in requisite qualifications. Most importantly, there was the question of uncertainty as to the extent of accountability for actions taken, and misplacement in terms of authority over United Nations staff. The information gathered during this review showed that these were all real problems. The solution implied an expeditious transition to a complement of staff that had proportionately fewer fixed- and short-term personnel of a limited duration, and

was characterized by a rational system of selecting and placing government-loaned military officers.

14. Perhaps the worst of these problems, from the perspective of the operations which the Division supports, is that current recruitment practices, contract possibilities and related funding limitations are not at all conducive to attracting qualified individuals, nor necessarily enlisting those with previous mission experience - which, according to virtually anyone who has been in the field, should be a prerequisite for assuming such a post. b/ Perhaps the most adverse vulnerability from a workload perspective was the need to train new people because a "short-timer" had left. The paperwork associated with preparing large quantities of short-term contracts was clearly a workload that could be avoided given a more appropriate staffing configuration. One possibility was to grant a two- to three-year contract with a 60-day cancellation clause under the new appointments of limited duration contracts, based on the 300 series of the Staff Rules that were promulgated in 1994, and that would allow appointments of three years. While the International Civil Service Commission has so far limited the use of the new series to certain field missions, appointments of limited duration could be considered for staff placed against posts from the support account.

15. A related issue is that of post classification and job descriptions. In the report of the Secretary-General on the support account for peace-keeping operations (A/45/493), criteria were set forth that were to be "observed in the creation of all temporary posts chargeable to the support account". One criteria (contained in paragraph 16 (e) of the report) was that "all posts are to be formally submitted to the Office of Human Resources Management for classification before authorization". The report further stated that "extreme care would be exercised in the application of these criteria, with special emphasis on (e)". The special emphasis referred to here is, in fact, the concept of "classification before authorization".

16. In this respect, the findings of the team suggested that the classification of temporary posts within the Division has not yet been done with "extreme care". Thus, only 40 per cent of all support account posts (excluding posts funded from general temporary assistance) have been classified, or 42 per cent, if all Division posts are considered. It is imperative that the Department take immediate action to complete quickly pending job descriptions and submit these to the Office of Human Resources Management for classification review. The timely completion of this exercise by the Department is crucial to validating the baseline for any future post redeployments/new posts requests that the Division/Department may wish to propose. Moreover, up-to-date staffing tables were not available centrally at the Division. Therefore, the team had to compile the data for the staffing tables included in this report. The exercise was tedious, given that the information sought had to be extracted from a variety of sources, the majority of which were neither complete nor current.

17. Notwithstanding the fact that the classification exercise was somewhat delinquent, efforts have been made to prepare and update job descriptions with the intention of getting these classified. In this connection, the team was able to obtain 142 job descriptions, including those of the generic "benchmark" type for the lower General Service staff. This represented 75 per cent of all

Division staff, including those on loan from other Department units or the field. For military personnel, approximately 60 per cent have job descriptions written specifically for the functions to be undertaken. Although the remainder may have details set forth in notes verbales, the team did not consider these to be job descriptions in the operational/organizational sense. In this connection, it should be noted that until such time as all temporary posts are classified, vacancies cannot be advertised, which only further restricts the Organization's ability to attract qualified personnel.

18. The team's findings on compartmentalization and fragmentation are illustrated in table 2. The data in the table indicates that in a number of instances, the Division's organizational structure includes small units with a staffing strength ranging from one to five staff members. In some cases, small units also share staff because of workload variations or because of a particular staff member's familiarity with the needs of another unit. In general, the proliferation of small units can serve to diffuse accountability and quite often proves operationally inefficient. Furthermore, the practice of organizing a small group into an official unit complete with a unit chief requires careful consideration given the status associated with "bosses", and the potential for "mini" bureaucracies to develop.

Table 2. Organizational structure of the Field Administration and Logistics Division showing small units

| Field Administration and Logistics Division Service | Unit/Section title | United Nations staff | Military | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Finance Management and Support Service | Information Management Unit | - | 1 | 1 |
| | Operational Review Unit | 2 | - | 2 |
| | Africa I Unit | 3 | - | 3 |
| | Africa II Unit | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| | Resource Planning Unit | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| Personnel Management Support Service | Records Management Unit | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| | Staffing Unit | 4 | - | 4 |
| | Policy, Planning, and Review Unit/Section | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| Logistics and Communications Service | Sea Transport Unit | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | Air Transport Unit | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| | Air Safety Unit | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| | Medical Advice Section | - | 2 | 2 |

19. In terms of specific findings relating to these small units, electronic data-processing personnel were found to have been scattered across the Division in one or two units within each Service. With some of these staff on loan from Member States (i.e., military officers), there was a risk that systems development and support might not be performed with a clear sense of coherence, and that adherence to methodologies and/or practices that were consistent with the long-term policies of the Organization might not necessarily be assured.

This was supported, in part, by the fact that the services of the Division have proceeded with systems development "on their own", and that both United Nations purchased and developed applications are not yet consistently utilized across missions.

20. In terms of organizational linkages, the review revealed a number of bottlenecks and interdepartmental dependencies which, although already known in some cases, were worth discussing from an operational point of view. The first of these involved the Personnel Management and Support Service. While the day-to-day operational link with the Office of Human Resources Management has since been removed by virtue of newly delegated authorities, the team had concerns regarding Personnel Management and Support Service preparedness for assuming the related functions (see paras. 41 and 42 below).

21. There was also a need to address an important organizational link between the Division and the Electronic Services Division/Department of Administration and Management. This need stemmed from the fact that the Electronic Services Division retained veto power over all electronic data-processing and communications-related purchases made by the Division on behalf of missions which, when exercised, had caused considerable delays. In such cases, delays have resulted from the need to brief Electronic Services Division staff on mission-specific communication networks in order to enable them to make informed decisions. Based on the information gathered, it would therefore appear that on the communications side of the Division's mandate, which related to the operation of telecommunications networks within peace-keeping missions, further strengthening and autonomy was warranted with a view to providing whatever assurances were necessary to removing the veto power of the Electronic Services Division, at least with respect to communications-related purchases. To do this, however, meant that the Division must be able to offer technical continuity, reliability, organizational experience/knowledge, and institutional memory in order to alleviate any concerns about its capacity. Such arrangements should be reviewed and reworked at regular intervals in order to ensure that the overall objectives of the Organization for a unified global telecommunications network were fulfilled and that policies and standards set by the Electronic Services Division were adhered to.

22. Another organizational link or potential impediment encountered, related to the applicability of United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules to peace-keeping operations. Specifically, a significant disparity often arose between the operational activities of a peace-keeping mission and the budget cycle. Although General Assembly resolution 49/233 changed the financial period for many missions to a period of one year (now 1 July to 30 June), it remains to be seen whether this will fully alleviate the problem of matching operational needs to available funds within a given budget cycle. The major difficulty experienced has been the inability to obligate funds towards the end of a financial period under the current procurement processes, which, because of their time-consuming nature, would extend into the next budget cycle before a purchase order could be raised. It was noted that in such cases, the Procurement and Transportation Section/Department of Administration and Management would usually avoid initiating the process when less than 30 days remained because of the uncertainty of funds. If the extended financial period (along with the additional planning time it affords staff), did not help in this

regard, there might be a need to hold the accounts open for a period of three months, as is the case with the regular budget, or perhaps to examine alternative rules for obligating funds when procurement exigencies arose. Procedures agreed on by the Controller and the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations for entering into contractual commitments against future financial authority for missions that have been in place since early 1995 indicate recognition by all concerned that the obligation of funds towards the end of a financial period is a problem that needs to be addressed.

23. Finally, with respect to the Division's relationship or link to the Purchase and Transport Section/Department of Administration and Management, the team took note of the various studies already conducted and, based on the findings of its own review, emphasized the need for expeditious solutions in the area of contracting. In this connection, the team was made aware of the intent of the Division to expand the use of systems contracts or other types of "pre-approved" arrangements in the interest of keeping the turn-around time to a minimum for all types of procurement suitable to such arrangements. The Purchase and Transport Section of the Office of Conference and Support Services and the Office of Legal Affairs are also involved in optimizing the use of these arrangements.

Management issues

24. Throughout the review, the team had the opportunity to examine a variety of management and operational issues that surfaced either as a result of face-to-face discussions with Division staff members concerning problems encountered during their tenure, or as a result of information collected, analysed, and verified. These were as follows:

(a) Not all staff have a sense of to whom and for what they are accountable. This appears to be due, in part, to an atmosphere of incident-driven responsibility where in some cases, as long as nothing goes wrong, staff are presumed to be doing "okay". This is further exacerbated by continuous staff turnover. Staff having no clear sense of accountability may be even less conscientious of actions taken when faced with an impending departure. In other instances, some units within the Division have assumed responsibility for certain actions or have been performing certain tasks which are either within the Division's mandate but not clear, or are outside its mandate:

(i) In the case of functions within the Division's mandate, but where responsibilities were less than clear, the issue of survey mission participation repeatedly surfaced. The common finding that emerged was that these missions, which formed the basis for planning and budgeting for peace-keeping operations, had been thinly staffed owing to timing and/or funding constraints as much as to the apparent failure by (or lack of authority in) the individuals responsible for planning these missions to involve knowledgeable Division staff. This took on a more serious tone when the Division had, in fact, a mandate for survey mission participation. The consequences of not staffing these missions with adequate representation from within the Division can be expressed in terms of both limited confidence in the plan and budget presented as a result of the survey mission, and in terms of an

abdication of responsibility or "ownership" when the final documents were completed. In the first case, this could cast doubt on Division leadership, whereas in the second, this could serve to compromise accountability;

(ii) With regard to tasks that fell outside the Division's mandate but were nevertheless being performed by the Division, one such situation involved the issue of additional war-risk insurance assessments. Clearly, the Division has the de facto responsibility to manage claims by contractors for reimbursement of additional war-risk insurance, whereas the Insurance Section within the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance/Department of Administration and Management has the authority to negotiate and finalize insurance arrangements. This responsibility should be reflected in the mandate of the Division. In this connection, the team's analysis of the information related to additional war-risk insurance claims gave rise to a serious concern over whether the current practice of paying for this coverage on an aircraft contractor-by-contractor basis was costing the Organization potentially millions of dollars more than if this were handled through what appears to be a viable alternative arrangement (i.e., fixed-price coverage for an extended period of time). The issue had been the subject of discussion between the Division/Department and the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance, and had also involved the Office of Legal Affairs; however, it is not clear why an alternative practice has not yet been effected. Given the significance of such a potential financial haemorrhage, there was no doubt that a final assessment of all alternative arrangements should be made with the utmost expediency;

(b) The potential existed for disjointed, ad hoc computer systems development, support and maintenance. As noted in paragraph 19, responsibilities for developing and supporting management information systems were scattered throughout the Division. Although some sound approaches to systems design had been noted during the review, procedures for ensuring the consistent development, utilization and maintenance of software applications did not exist for either Headquarters or the field. Therefore, it was not surprising to discover that certain units or missions had no sense of commitment to utilizing a particular system, thereby compromising any sense of standardization and increasing the learning curve as staff proceeded from one environment to another;

(c) The monitoring functions performed by the Division have thus far been limited with respect to peace-keeping mission-based reviews. The unit responsible for this function has been occupied with, inter alia, audit-related functions to the extent of liaising with organizational units, missions and auditors at the pre-audit stage, and acting as a focal point for addressing/responding to audit findings/recommendations once an audit report was issued. Given the importance of responding to audit reports in a timely manner, the authority often required to do this and the nature of mission reviews, it would seem that responsibility for ensuring that these functions were properly performed was currently misplaced, and accordingly did not belong in the Finance

Management and Support Service. It would be more logical to locate this function in the Office of the Director.

Control issues

25. The control environment of the Division has not provided adequate safeguards to protect resources and, as a result, the Organization remains subject to considerable financial risk. The major areas of concern in this report include (a) potential unrecorded liabilities, (b) inadequate asset control and (c) uncertainty over insurance coverage.

26. With respect to potential liabilities, the team found that an additional influx of previously unrecorded claims for contingent-owned equipment and aircraft usage was likely, but for which the exact dollar amount was not yet known. In this connection, it should be noted that letters of assist are generally used as a procurement mechanism for certain goods and services which might not be available commercially. As acknowledged by the Division, the provision of equipment or services by troop-contributing countries without such documentation has been a major weakness in this process. Until such time as authoritative procedures for dealing with contingent-owned equipment complexities are in place and fully adhered to, financial uncertainties will continue to place the Organization at risk.

27. With respect to asset control, the findings suggest that the Organization does not have an automated up-to-date Headquarters-based inventory of assets world wide. The financial implications of this could be significant, and could readily be seen both in the potential for misappropriation as well as in the potential for purchasing equipment which might already be available as missions liquidate and new ones become established. The lack of adequate asset control was equivalent to negligence. The Office of Internal Oversight Services has been informed that this problem had already been recognized by the Division and that the Division had prepared two reports for submission to the General Assembly. The report on management of peace-keeping assets: surplus asset storage facilities and mission start-up kits has recently been issued for consideration by the General Assembly (A/49/936), while the report on management of peace-keeping assets: policy, technique and accounting issues is under discussion with the Department of Administration and Management. Another internal control issue related to the Division's recent experiences with a number of contracts for the provision of essential services to peace-keeping operations. These have highlighted the need to develop a capability to monitor and assess certain aspects of the performance of large-scale contracts, including review and analysis of progress reports. In response to this requirement, the team was brought to understand that the Division had drafted a plan of action for instituting the capacity to manage commercial contract-providing services to peace-keeping operations.

28. The third significant finding regarding controls indicated that the Organization was possibly paying too much for additional war-risk insurance on the one hand (as mentioned in para. 24 (a) (ii) above), while on the other hand, it might not be adequately covered with regard to third party liability in cases where troop-contributing countries contract with civilian airlines and do not provide evidence that the United Nations is protected against third party

actions in the event of an aircraft accident. In the latter case, no verification procedures exist to ensure that civilian air carriers contracted by troop-contributing countries carry sufficient insurance to protect the United Nations from third party liability. While troop-contributing countries may insist through letters of assist that they will decide on which aircraft will transport their troops, this should not prohibit United Nations involvement in the process of due diligence/quality assurance.

Legislative issues

29. The team examined the method of calculating the peace-keeping support cost and whether the resources authorized under the support account are consistent with the overall requirements. While it may be simple and transparent in terms of equitable distribution across missions, its relationship to actual workload and associated resource requirements appeared doubtful.

30. In this connection, it should be recalled that the methodology used to calculate the peace-keeping support account was established in May 1990, and set at a flat rate of 8.5 per cent of the salaries, common staff costs, and travel of the civilian component of peace-keeping missions. The rationale for this was set forth in the report of the Secretary-General (A/45/493) in which he explained that the percentage reflected existing experience as applied to five peace-keeping missions with dissimilar characteristics, and that this was being proposed as a first step, subject to review after two years' experience.

31. Although the Secretary-General reaffirmed his support of a flat 8.5 per cent in his report of 22 October 1993 on the support account for peace-keeping operations (A/48/470), he also stressed the importance of providing adequate resources to those units actually supporting peace-keeping operations. In his report of 27 May 1994 (A/48/470/Add.1), he elaborated on a proposal for establishing a proper mix of "continuing" and "flexible" posts to differentiate between requirements of an ongoing nature and those that were likely to expand (or contract) as new peace-keeping missions started up, and completed ones wound down.

32. The team was of the opinion that the 8.5 flat percentage formula was no longer valid because it was based on a set of circumstances which, at the time, included a certain mix of military to civilian personnel. In this regard the team noted that there were approximately 10,000 military and 5,000 civilian personnel in 1990, whereas in 1994 this grew to 75,000 military and 13,000 civilian personnel. On the military side, this reflected a 750 per cent increase, while on the civilian side, it amounted to a 160 per cent increase. In terms of ratios, where there was a 2 to 1 ratio of military to civilian personnel in 1990, this grew to nearly a 7 to 1 ratio by 1994.

33. By weighting the 8.5 percentage formula more on the civilian component, the backstopping workload associated with the military component was essentially ignored. Therefore, the methodology used for the flat rate does not appear to be appropriate any longer to calculate support resources for such a dramatically changed mix of peace-keeping personnel. This assertion is based on many factors, but primarily on the fact that there is a real workload associated with the support of military forces, and the information gathered during the review

supports this. Examples of where the military-related workload was most readily seen and no "automatic" adjustment had been made to available resources were in the areas of contingent-owned equipment, troop and cargo movements, supply requisitioning and letters of assist.

34. In the case of contingent-owned equipment, the backlog of recorded claims as of 31 December 1993 amounted to $320 million. As of 31 December 1994, the outstanding balance had grown to $580 million. While some of this was attributable to funding limitations, the ability to process the increasing volume of claims was directly correlated to the availability of adequate posts in that area. The team was of the opinion that this would continue to grow unless resources were provided to assist in both clearing the backlog, and in preventing it from recurring in the future. An indication that perhaps management may not have been aware of these requirements or of the workload associated with military forces, was contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/49/717) of 28 November 1994 in which the only post requested for the Finance Management and Support Service at that time was a Deputy Chief of Service.

35. Another factor casting some doubt on the validity of this flat percentage rate was the fact that it assumed support costs were predominately variable and, further, that the components of support could be aggregated to arrive at a single percentage applied to certain budget lines. Without going into great detail here, the support costs for peace-keeping would seem to be semi-variable in nature, which implies that support requirements would vary in relation to a range of elements whereby at one level (or within one range), the requirements would be one amount, then held constant until the next range or level had been reached, and so on. In the case of support for peace-keeping operations, however, the semi-variable cost approach must also be applied in conjunction with a minimum fixed or base amount of support.

36. The Secretary-General recognized this in his recent reports on the subject (A/48/470/Add.1 and A/49/717), where he suggested that certain core posts and functions be funded from the regular budget, with the balance of the requirements funded from the support account. While the team concurs that a core workload would always exist for field support and peace-keeping operations, the balance remains something other than a purely variable cost scenario and accordingly resorting to a flat percentage rate would yield an accurate result.

37. It should be noted that the United Nations system has had previous experience in analysing support cost arrangements. The exercise undertaken by a group of experts to examine the support cost arrangements of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was a case in point. c/ While in no way comparing UNDP operations to those of the Department, the UNDP exercise resulted in a successor arrangement replacing what was a flat percentage (i.e., 13 per cent) paid to executing agencies, with varying percentages applied to different clusters of service. The basic rationale behind this was that the level of effort involved in providing one type of support was different from that of another type.

## A. Overall conclusions

38. The overall conclusion reached on the basis of the team's review is that the Division was not adequately fulfilling its mandate. The ad hoc style of administering field operations which had prevailed should be replaced by a more proactive management approach with coherent, workable policies and procedures, thereby increasing the capacity to respond more predictably and efficiently in support of peace-keeping operations. Issues such as the inappropriate mix of personnel (including the relatively short-term contractual status of many of these individuals), the inability to advertise all posts and attract longer-term and better qualified staff, the lack of clear responsibilities, direction and accountability and the inadequate control environment, require prompt corrective action.

39. The review identified three areas where the inadequacy of staff resources posed a serious risk to the Organization. The first area was that of the Claims Administration Unit within the Finance Management and Support Service. Requirements for that area could be segregated into (a) what was temporarily needed to clear up backlogs and "get the house in order", (b) what was needed on an ongoing basis to address the minimum workload, and (c) what could be considered expandable/contractible as a function of new or liquidating missions. Because of the nature of this workload, the complement of staff should probably comprise a strong "base" of United Nations civilian staff members, some ideally with military backgrounds, "topped off" as necessary with military officers.

40. The second area where the inadequacy of resources could place the Organization at risk was in the area of asset management and control. It is recommended that the Division management address this issue as a matter of priority. In this connection, it should be noted that in view of the significant financial implications of inadequate asset management and control, the Office of Internal Oversight Services is considering undertaking an investigation into the issue with a view to determining the extent of vulnerability the Organization faces with respect to (a) possibilities for misappropriation and (b) waste of resources owing to the inability to relate asset ownership to procurement decisions. Similarly, the Office of Internal Oversight Services is considering investigating the issue of additional war-risk insurance and third party liability under letters of assist to determine in the former case (a) the extent to which the Organization may be paying excessive amounts for coverage, (b) why organizational bottlenecks have occurred in this area, and (c) why this has not received a higher priority. In the latter case, this should serve to assess the extent of the Organization's rights to verify, inter alia, the adequacy of insurance coverage and safety-related matters when troop-contributing countries contract with civilian airlines.

41. The third area where some immediate relief is required is the Staffing Unit within the Personnel Management and Support Service. This need has become more urgent given that the Personnel Management and Support Service does not yet have the capacity to discharge the responsibilities it has recently received through a second delegation of authority from the Office of Human Resources Management. While the team understands the need and supports the principle of delegation of authority, it believes it would have been preferable to assist the Personnel Management and Support Service in strengthening its state of preparedness prior

to vesting it with additional responsibilities. Concrete steps should now be taken on a post facto basis to protect the integrity of the entire recruitment process.

42. To this end, there is a real need to organize the staffing function under a strong manager, so as to (a) finalize all personnel management systems and ensure that they are fully functional and ultimately consistent with the objectives of the Integrated Management Information System exercise; (b) populate these systems with relevant data; (c) review data in the roster of the Office of Human Resources Management to determine which candidate profiles, if any, should be transferred to the Personnel Management and Support Service roster; (d) transfer these data; (e) establish procedures for candidate acknowledgement and interaction; and (f) finalize all new relevant forms and memoranda. For its part the Office of Human Resources Management should continue to provide assistance during the transition with certain portions of the workload pending the receipt (and orientation) by the Personnel Management and Support Service of its final complement of staff. Once this transition is complete, the Division and the Department of Administration and Management should ensure that the Division's personnel management needs are incorporated in the Integrated Management Information System exercise.

43. Notwithstanding any strengthening made possible through support account resources, any further requests for additional resources should be subject to (a) Division management adequately addressing the organizational and managerial concerns raised in this report, and (b) a satisfactory review of the methodology used to calculate the support account resources in an effort to accurately relate the needs of support operations to resource requirements.

44. Finally, the findings of the report suggest that there may be considerable merit to reviewing the operational support requirements from the field perspective. The results of such a field based review would undoubtedly assist in completing the picture regarding the issues affecting the efficiency of peace-keeping operations.

B. Findings specific to each Field Administration and Logistics Division service

1. Finance Management and Support Service

Summary of findings

| Category | Sections | | | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | FP | FM | FR/C | |
| Capacity/ continuity | ✓ | | ✓ | (1) The Resource Planning Unit's officer-in-charge is a military officer. As previously noted, individuals on short-term or rotational assignments placed in management positions (where continuity and institutional memory are critical) are long-term risks to the Organization.<br><br>(2) The Claims Unit is hampered by a shortfall of knowledgeable staff to process claims submitted by troop-contributing countries. The need for adequate numbers of qualified staff cannot be overemphasized if claim determinations are to be accurate and backlogs avoided.<br><br>(3) The Operational Review Unit, with two staff and a mandate focused on audit-related matters, certifying officers and signatory panels, internal controls and peace-keeping-related financial policies, likewise, appears somewhat inappropriately staffed at this time. |
| Backlogs/ bottlenecks | | | ✓ | Bottlenecks of an operational nature have occurred between the Finance Management and Support Service and the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance where claims submitted for payment were not processed before the validity of funds expired. |
| Potential liabilities | | | ✓ | Liabilities are believed to exist as a result of actions taken prior to the introduction by the Field Administration and Logistics Division of its letter of assist procedures. Although the exact amount is not known, the Organization has received (and is likely to continue to receive) contingent-owned equipment-related claims from troop-contributing countries against which no obligations have been recorded. |
| Scope of authority | ✓ | | ✓ | (1) The Resource Planning Unit has occasionally embarked on survey missions sans Logistics and Communications Service or Personnel Management and Support Service participation. Regardless of what exigencies may have prompted such action, the authority to take such decisions is considered well beyond the scope of this Service.<br><br>(2) The Operational Review Unit is currently vested with full responsibility for ensuring Field Administration and Logistics Division follow-up on all audit-related matters. If, however, recommendations are to be made which may affect any level of the Organization, the placement of such authority in this (or any Service) is considered inappropriate. |

| Category | Sections | | | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | FP | FM | FR/C | |
| Administrative/ financial procedures/ guidelines | | ✓ | ✓ | (1) This Service is acutely aware of the potential disparity between mission activities and budget cycles. General Assembly resolution 49/233 extended the cycle for many missions to one year, however, this may not alleviate the problem of matching operational needs to available funds (e.g., funds may be available, but "impossible" to effectively obligate before the end of a cycle). The Field Administration and Logistics Division and the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance should monitor this periodically to determine whether alternative rules or measures such as keeping the accounts open for a period of time will alleviate the problem.<br><br>(2) The Claims Unit is furthermore disadvantaged by a lack of written guidance for processing certain types of contingent-owned equipment claims as well as others related to the provision of troops. |
| Questionable practices | ✓ | | | The Information Management Unit's organizational structure, at best, remains vague. The only "constant" here has been a military officer who (having performed admirably in developing various strategic databases) might be more effectively utilized as a valuable electronic data-processing resource elsewhere under other Field Administration and Logistics Division management. |

FP = Financial Planning Section, FM = Financial Management Section, FR/C = Financial Review/Claims Section

Summary of conclusions

45. The above-noted findings suggest that the Finance Management and Support Service (a) does not yet have adequate capacity to discharge its responsibilities for claims management, (b) lacks clear guidance for handling certain claims, (c) is vested with misplaced authority involving both survey mission- and operational review-related activities and (d) as elsewhere in the Division is fragmented into small units that should either be realigned or transferred (i.e., as with the Operational Review and Information Management Units, respectively).

## 2. Personnel Management and Support Service

Summary of findings

| Category | Sections | | | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | PP/R | A&R | SS | |
| Capacity/ continuity | | | ✓ | The staffing unit is seriously constrained by a shortfall of management and support staff relative to its current volume of activity. A senior officer in the form of a Section Chief has not yet been appointed and, accordingly, preparedness for the assumption of newly delegated authority is far from complete. Still pending, in fact, is the need to, inter alia, fully integrate and test all newly designed computer systems, review the Office of Human Resources Management's existing roster of applicants, transfer relevant applicant data to this unit's roster, and follow through with all associated organizational/operational changes currently in process. |
| Backlogs/ bottlenecks | | ✓ | ✓ | (1) Bottlenecks have yet to be resolved with respect to recording new staff for payroll purposes. Although advances have been made, the Administration and Records Section may still require anywhere from one to four months to obtain and record all requisite post numbers, index numbers and entitlement-related data for newly appointed mission staff.<br><br>(2) Backlogs in updating staffing data (i.e., staffing tables, vacancy rates, etc.) have developed and are likely to persist owing to a shortfall of staff in the Staffing Unit and, in turn, an inability to follow up with individual missions in a timely and effective manner.<br><br>(3) Backlog in settling claims of mission staff, military and police observers for injury or death or for loss of personal effects. |
| Checks and balances | | | ✓ | Given its newly delegated authority (i.e., to recruit, select, appoint and grade candidates for field mission assignments), the Personnel Management and Support Service will need to define and implement appropriate measures to provide reasonable assurances as to the integrity and transparency of all future selection committee proceedings, as required. |
| Inefficient practices | | ✓ | | (1) The Administrative Report in its present form has become increasingly cumbersome and may, in fact, have outlived its usefulness as a concise exchange of information between the Division and the field. Although designed to encompass personnel, finance and procurement-related topics, such a cross-section of information may, in effect, be better handled if unbundled and more directly routed (i.e. electronically or otherwise) to target offices.<br><br>(2) Although relatively new to utilizing the United Nations Integrated Management Information System Personnel Module, Administration and Records Section staff have expressed concern regarding not only the effectiveness of existing validity checks and data entry controls, but the logic and responsiveness of the editing capability currently available. |

| Category | Sections | | | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | PP/R | A&R | SS | |
| Questionable practices | | ✓ | ✓ | (1) The resources currently assigned to the Records Management Unit are not being utilized as initially envisaged and may, in fact, be more effectively managed by the chief of that section with electronic data-processing service-related staff utilized elsewhere under other Division management.<br><br>(2) The success rate of proposed-to-approved staffing tables submitted by the Personnel Management and Support Service (for new or expanding missions) is currently zero. The result is always less than that requested (and believed to be required) consequently, concern vis-à-vis the confidence placed in the Personnel Management and Support Service by the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the General Assembly continues to rise. |
| Other practices | ✓ | | | The role currently assumed by the Policy Planning and Review Unit/Section for "transitional" purposes (i.e., the planning and oversight of all newly delegated authorities/responsibilities) will some day conclude, at which time a redefinition/realignment of this "body" will be warranted. |

PP/R = Policy Planning & Review Unit/Section, A&R = Administration & Records Section,
SS = Staffing Support Section

Summary of conclusions

46. The above-noted findings suggest that the Personnel Management and Support Service (a) is not yet adequately prepared to assume efficiently and effectively full responsibility for its newly delegated appointment authority and, in certain respects (b) is fragmented into organizational "bodies" that might be more constructively utilized if either realigned or transferred (i.e., with the Records Management Unit and the Policy Planning and Review Unit/Section, once new authorities are fully operationalized).

## 3. Logistics and Communications Service

Summary of findings

| Category | Sections | | | | | | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MA | LO | ENG | ESS | TRN | SPP | |
| Capacity/ continuity | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | In numerous Logistics and Communications Service Units, the disproportionately high number of military officers (on one- to two-year assignments) in positions of authority and/or where continuity and institutional memory are critical is seen as a factor contributing to a host of potential long-term risks to the Organization. |
| Backlogs/ bottlenecks | | ✓ | | ✓ | | | (1) The pace at which various authorities (i.e., for local procurement, contract committees, survey boards, etc.) are delegated to the field and/or initial low ceilings are revised, has a direct effect on the workload and will continue to result in backlogs throughout various Logistics and Communications Service Units to whom all such responsibilities revert until said authorities are delegated.<br><br>(2) Bottlenecks of an operational nature have occurred between the Communications Unit and the Electronic Services Division within the Department of Administration and Management owing, at least in part, to the veto power retained by the Electronic Services Division over Electronic Services Section procurement-related decisions. Were it possible to obtain certain assurances, it is unlikely such review/approval authority would be warranted. |
| Potential liabilities | | | | | ✓ | | The Air Safety Unit continues to discover past uses of aircraft by troop-contributing countries but, in many cases, remains unable to find agreements under which such uses were authorized. Given the typical costs associated with same, it is likely that potential liabilities are significant. |
| Asset control | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | The Logistics and Communications Service does not yet have an automated up-to-date world-wide inventory of peace-keeping assets. This is attributable, in part, to a lack of available resources and, in part, to Field Administration and Logistics Division systems management - as yet in the throes of decision-making (i.e., to make, buy, or given the magnitude of the reality system investment, modify existing software). |

| Category | Sections | | | | | | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MA | LO | ENG | ESS | TRN | SPP | |
| Scope of authority | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | The Air Transport Unit has, in effect, become responsible for the "management" of war-risk insurance, while the Electronic Data-Processing Unit has taken on increasing responsibility for the "management" of Field Administration and Logistics Division systems and network-related functions. In neither case do existing mandates encompass these responsibilities. |
| Administrative/ financial procedures/ guidelines | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | In numerous Logistics and Communications Service Units, insufficient written guidance exists on how staff should proceed on a day-to-day basis. Given the prevailing attrition rate and inordinately steep learning curve confronting all new staff (and military officers) documented procedures are essential to sound operations. |
| Checks and balances | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | Staff in various electronic services and transport units have questioned to whom and for what they (and their military counterparts) are accountable and have emphasized the need for more meaningful "benchmarks" against which performance could be measured. Despite such ambiguity, however, several situations exist in which significant technical responsibility has been (and remains) vested in just one or two Professional staff. |
| Inefficient practices | | | | ✓ | | | Cognizant staff in the Division and other United Nations divisions have not yet effectively integrated/operationalized the Organization's existing procurement system ("reality"). Inter-departmentally this results in a duplication of effort (i.e. by the Procurement and Transportation Service) and, in the field, in a lack of systems standardization across missions. |
| Questionable practices | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | Staff in various Transport Units have not yet participated in technical survey missions which, in light of their inevitable involvement in budget formulation and day-to-day support, would seem to serve a multitude of good - both for planning and for management purposes. |

MA = Medical Advice Section, LO = Logistic Operations Section, ENG = Engineering Section,
ESS = Electronic Services Section, TRN = Transport Section, SPP = Supply Section

Summary of conclusions

47. The above-noted findings suggest that the Logistics and Communications Service (a) does not reflect a rational mix of military-to-United Nations staff for purposes of long-term operational stability, (b) lacks adequate guidance and capacity to discharge its responsibilities pertaining to asset management/control and (c) as observed in other Division services is fragmented into small units/sections which should either be realigned or supplemented with additional staff.

## III. RECOMMENDATIONS

48. Consistent with the overall and specific findings and conclusions presented in the previous section, the following recommendations are made:

Recommendations which call for Division/Department action

(a) Review the staffing situation of the Division and make recommendation for a more appropriate mix. Such a mix should reflect far less short-term personnel and limit military officers to positions of a purely technical advisory capacity. The practice of assigning military officers to positions of authority, or to positions where considerable institutional memory would be lost upon their departure should be avoided. In addition, Division management should insist upon the right to thoroughly screen military officers prior to their placement;

(b) Institute measures and procedures to ensure that all staff members, including those on loan from a Member State understand what is expected of them, and to whom and for what they are accountable;

(c) Prepare job descriptions for all positions within the Division, including all temporary posts as well as those positions assumed by military officers on loan from Member States;

(d) The General Assembly by its resolution 49/250 of 20 July 1995 decided to approve, on an exceptional basis and conditionally, the Secretary-General's long-pending request for conversion of 61 general temporary assistance funded support account positions to temporary post status, exclusively for the purposes/functions proposed by the Secretary-General in his report (A/48/470/Add.1). This should provide a measure of immediate relief to the Division with respect to advertising and hiring staff on short-term contracts. However, for the Division/Department to take advantage of this positive development as well as to comply with the linkage of posts to functions by the General Assembly, it is imperative that the Division take immediate action to complete all pending job descriptions and submit all "classifiable" posts funded from the support account to the Office of Human Resources Management for classification without delay;

(e) Review the areas where a lack of written guidance in the form of administrative policies and procedures is indicated and take action to put these in place;

(f) Consider consolidating all electronic data-processing personnel "under one roof" in order to ensure coherence in the entire process of computer systems development and maintenance, while at the same time continuing to support all Division services. Thus, electronic data-processing personnel from other Division services should be merged into one single section, thereby eliminating the need for separate units in those services (i.e., Information Management in the Finance Management and Support Service and Records Management in the Personnel Management and Support Service). All tasks related to electronic data-processing requisitioning would remain with this section, but without the need for a separate processing unit as explained in paragraph (m) below;

(g) Examine ways and means for standardization of computer systems across missions and look at how this could be improved, consistent with a strengthened, more coherent Electronic Data-Processing Section;

(h) Consider strengthening the Communications Unit by providing it with the necessary resources (within existing resources) and by redeploying General Service staff from the Electronic Data-Processing Unit who are already servicing the Communications Unit. A case should be made for receiving increased authority from the Electronic Services Division/Department of Administration and Management to purchase communications-related equipment for peace-keeping operations with all the necessary assurances to be provided by the Division, taking into account the overall objectives of the Organization to have a unified global telecommunications network and recognizing the policy-making and standard-setting role of the Electronic Services Division/Department of Administration and Management;

(i) Transfer responsibility for conducting operational reviews and for all audit-related matters to the Office of the Director. In so doing, the need for a separate Operational Review Unit within the Finance Management and Support Service is diminished, and any remaining responsibilities could then be absorbed into the office of the chief of that service;

(j) Transfer responsibility for appointing survey mission participants to the Office of the Director of the Division in the interest of ensuring adequate representation from all cognizant units/sections and, in turn, providing a greater sense of confidence in the outcome of those missions;

(k) Merge the two separate units within the Division that deal with missions in Africa into one. Similarly, merge the Air Safety and Air Transport Units;

(l) Maintain the organizational "status" of the Medical Advice Section, and the Sea Transport Unit in view of the specialized expertise and the additional staff required in those areas;

(m) Establish an action plan for managing/controlling the Organization's assets, including requisite systems and procedures. Serious consideration

should be given to (a) developing a unique coding system whereby all inventory items with the same characteristic are given the same code world wide, and (b) exploring all available software alternatives for the maintenance of an asset control system. As it is not advisable to vest management and control in one single unit asset, and in light of the recommendations noted in paragraph (f) above regarding consolidation of electronic data-processing personnel and the transfer of some resources from the Electronic Data-Processing Unit to the Communications Unit, it is recommended that what would remain of the Electronic Data-Processing Unit be dismantled, and any residual staff required for data entry/processing purposes be distributed to other Logistics and Communications Service sections according to need;

(n) Proceed with requests for additional resources in the areas of claims and personnel. In the latter case, the Personnel Management and Support Service should prepare an action plan for the balance of the year outlining key targets, dates and deadlines to be met along with the resource requirements necessary for both an orderly transition and for a transparent monitoring of the effectiveness of its management;

Recommendations which call for action by the Department of Administration and Management

(o) The Office of Internal Oversight Services views the recent Office of Human Resources Management delegation of authority to the Division as a step for improved management of peace-keeping operations, as it stems from the principle that those most directly responsible for the work programme are to be provided with the maximum operational authority to accomplish their task. The Office of Internal Oversight Services has, however, concerns about the ability of the Division/Department to discharge the resulting additional responsibilities effectively in the immediate future. It is, therefore, recommended that (a) the situation be kept under close scrutiny (during the first-year period) by all concerned, particularly the Office of Human Resources Management, and (b) the Office of Human Resources Management should provide guidance to the Personnel Management and Support Service of the Division/Department in building up its capacity, particularly in the area of staffing policy, determination of skill profiles, training and the administration of entitlements and benefits;

(p) Consider ways and means of enlarging the pool of staff well-trained in the various areas of administration and management and ensuring the rotation of staff with such qualifications and experience to the Division and the field. In this connection, the team became increasingly aware of the necessity of field-based knowledge and experience in supporting peace-keeping missions;

(q) Given the substantial financial implications involved in the current arrangements for additional war-risk insurance, referred to in paragraph 24 (a) (ii), alternative arrangements should be sought with the utmost expediency;

(r) Consider ways and means of making the organizational linkages between the Division/Department and the Department of Administration and Management more responsive to the need for expeditious action for support for peace-keeping

operations subject to continuing oversight and the necessary controls by the Department of Administration and Management;

(s) During the course of the review, the team observed that the working conditions of the Division are, in many cases, over-crowded. As such conditions are not conducive to productivity, alternative arrangements should be considered, as appropriate.

## The General Assembly

49. The Office of Internal Oversight Services welcomes the General Assembly's decision in its resolution 49/249 to review annually and for the first time no later than spring 1996 the current methodology of financing the support account at the rate of 8.5 per cent of the estimated cost of the civilian staff component. The General Assembly may wish to consider approving (a) the additional resources for the Division requested in the proposed programme budget for the biennium 1996-1997, and (b) additional resources for the Division under the support account relative to each service's mandate once qualitative improvements are in place.

## Notes

a/ This review was undertaken by a term of Office of Internal Oversight Services staff and consultants from the Institute for Management and Accountability of Foreign Assistance.

b/ In discussions with nearly all Division senior management staff, as well as those from the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance, there was a general consensus that shortages of qualified field staff were most acute in the areas of administration, budget and finance. In that regard, the Organization may be doubly at risk where Headquarters is also short-staffed in those areas.

c/ See UNDP Governing Council decision 90/5; see also DP/1990/9.

# ANNEX I

## Field Administration and Logistics Division staffing summaries
## (as of 30 April 1995)

Table 1. Distribution of staff of the Division against authorized posts

| Field Administration and Logistics Division Service | Regular Budget Posts | | | | | | | Support Account Posts | | | | | | | General Temporary Assistance | | | | | | Total Posts | Apprvd by GA | Diff-erence | OTHER STAFF | | Total No. Staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | P | | GS | | Vacancies | | Ttl | P | | GS | | Vacancies | | Ttl | P | | GS | | Vacancies | Ttl | | | | Borrowed from Other UN Depts/ Units (Table 2) | Govmnt Loaned Military Officers (Table 3) | |
| | PE | F/S | PE | F/S | P | GS | | PE | F/S | PE | F/S | P | GS | | PE | F/S | PE | F/S | P | | | | | | | |
| OD | 2 | - | 1 | - | - | - | 3 | 1 | 1 | - | 2 | - | - | 4 | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 19 | -10 | - | - | 9 |
| FMSS | 2 | - | 2 | 1 | - | - | 5 | 2 | 10 | 6 | 11 | 5 | - | 34 a/ | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 4 | 43 | 41 | + 2 | 3 | 7 | 53 |
| PMSS | 2 | 2 | 5 | 1 | - | - | 10 | 5 | 2 | 12 | 24 | 1 | - | 44 | 1 | - | - | 1 | - | 2 | 56 | 38 | +18 | 4 | 3 | 63 |
| LCS | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | 2 | 3 | 15 | 8 | 26 | 3 | - | 55 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 12 | 69 | 79 | -10 | 5 | 35 | 109 |
| Total | 6 | 3 | 9 | 2 | - | - | 20 | 11 | 28 | 26 | 63 | 9 | - | 137 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 20 | 177 | 177 | - 0 - | 12 | 45 | 234 |

Table 2. Distribution of borrowed staff of the Division

| Field Administration and Logistics Division Service | P | | GS | | Total | Source of Personnel |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | PE | F/S | PE | F/S | | |
| OD | - | - | - | - | - | Nil |
| FMSS | 1 | 2 | - | - | 3 | Field Service Officers & DPKO GTA (i.e., not FALD GTA) |
| PMSS | - | 2 | - | 2 | 4 | " " " " |
| LCS | - | 5 | - | - | 5 | " " " " |
| Total | 1 | 9 | - | 2 | 12 | |

Table 3. Distribution of military loaned staff of the Division (by regional group) b/

| Field Administration and Logistics Division Service | Western Europe and Other | Eastern Europe | Asia | Latin America and Caribbean | Africa | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OD | - | - | - | - | - | - 0 - |
| FMSS | 6 | 1 | - | - | - | 7 |
| PMSS | 3 | - | - | - | - | 3 |
| LCS | 30 | 1 | 1 | 3 | - | 35 |
| Total | 39 | 2 | 1 | 3 | - 0 - | 45 |

a/ The General Assembly approved a total of 46 support account posts for Finance Management and Support Service (including those funded from General Temporary Assistance), however, 10 of these were transferred to the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance in accordance with an agreement dated 23 December 1994 on the delineation of responsibilities between the Department for Peace-keeping Operations and the Department of Administration and Management.

b/ All military officers attached to the Division are on loan from Member States. Thus, none of these individuals is under United Nations contract, nor are they encumbering any posts.

# ANNEX II

## Field Administration and Logistics Division staffing mix and composition
## (as of 30 April 1995)

Table

| Field Administration and Logistics Division Service/Section | STAFFING MIX | | | | Total staff | STAFFING COMPOSITION | | | | | | | P:GS ratio | Average a/ OT/mo | JOB DESCRIPTIONS | | | | Classified posts | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Military | | United Nations posts | | | Permanent United Nations posts | | | Fixed/short-term United Nations posts | | | | | | Military | | United Nations posts | | | |
| | Number | Per cent | Number | Per cent | | P | GS | Per cent | P | GS | Per cent | ≤ 11 mo | | | Number | Per cent | Number | Per cent | Number | Per cent |
| OD | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Office of the Chief | - | - | 8 | 100 | 8 | 3 | 1 | 50 | 1 | 3 | 50 | 3 | 1 : 1.0 | 143 | - | - | 6 | 75 | 6 | 75 |
| - Vacant posts | - | - | 1 | 100 | 1 | - | - | - | 1 | - | 100 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total (by Office) | - | | 9 | | 9 | 3 | 1 | | 2 | 3 | | 3 | 1.3 : 1 | 143 | - | | 6 | | 6 | |
| Per cent (by Office) b/ | - | | 100 | | 100 | 33 | 11 | | 22 | 33 | | 60 | | | - | | 67 | | 67 | |
| FMSS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Office of the Chief | - | - | 4 | 100 | 4 | 1 | - | 25 | 1 | 2 | 75 | 1 | 1 : 1.0 | 46 | - | - | 3 | 75 | - | - |
| - Financial Planning | 3 | 50 | 3 | 50 | 6 | - | - | - | 3 | - | 100 | 2 | [3:0] | 139 | 1 | 33 | - | - | - | - |
| - Financial Management | 1 | 4 | 22 | 96 | 23 | 4 | 6 | 45 | 5 | 7 | 55 | 2 | 1 : 1.4 | 158 | - | - | 16 | 73 | 13 | 59 |
| - Financial Review/Claims | 3 | 20 | 12 | 80 | 15 | 1 | 3 | 33 | 4 | 4 | 67 | 4 | 1 : 1.4 | 23 | - | - | 5 | 42 | 3 | 25 |
| - Vacant posts | - | - | 5 | 100 | 5 | - | - | - | 5 | - | 100 | - | - | - | - | - | 3 | 60 | 1 | 20 |
| Total (by Service) | 7 | | 46 | | 53 | 6 | 9 | | 18 | 13 | | 9 | 1.1 : 1 | 366 | 1 | | 27 | | 17 | |
| Per cent (by Service) | 13 | | 87 | | 100 | 13 | 20 | | 39 | 28 | | 29 | | | 14 | | 59 | | 37 | |
| PMSS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Office of the Chief | - | - | 5 | 100 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 40 | - | 3 | 60 | - | 1 : 4.0 | 151 | - | - | 5 | 100 | 4 | 80 |
| - Policy Planning & Review | 1 | 17 | 5 | 83 | 6 | - | - | - | 5 | - | 100 | 2 | [5:0] | - | - | - | 4 | 80 | 1 | 20 |
| - Administration & Records | 1 | 3 | 29 | 97 | 30 | 5 | 12 | 59 | 1 | 11 | 41 | 6 | 1 : 3.8 | 100 | - | - | 26 | 90 | 26 | 90 |
| - Staffing support | 1 | 5 | 20 | 95 | 21 | 2 | 4 | 30 | - | 14 | 70 | 3 | 1 : 9.0 | 383 | - | - | 16 | 80 | 16 | 80 |
| - Vacant posts | - | - | 1 | 100 | 1 | - | - | - | 1 | - | 100 | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 100 | 1 | 100 |
| Total (by Service) | 3 | | 60 | | 63 | 8 | 17 | | 7 | 28 | | 11 | 1 : 3.0 | 514 | - | | 52 | | 48 | |
| Per cent (by Service) | 5 | | 95 | | 100 | 13 | 28 | | 12 | 47 | | 31 | | | - | | 87 | | 80 | |
| LCS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - Office of the Chief | - | - | 7 | 100 | 7 | - | - | - | 4 | 3 | 100 | 3 | 1.3 : 1 | 57 | - | - | 7 | 100 | 1 | 14 |
| - Medical advice | 2 | 100 | - | - | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 50 | - | - | - | - |
| - Logistic Operations | 10 | 43 | 13 | 57 | 23 | 2 | 1 | 23 | 1 | 9 | 77 | 1 | 1 : 3.3 | 92 | 8 | 80 | 7 | 54 | 1 | 8 |
| - Engineering | 4 | 40 | 6 | 60 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 67 | 1 | 1 | 33 | 1 | 1 : 1.0 | 6 | 4 | 100 | 5 | 83 | - | - |
| - Electronic Services | 2 | 8 | 22 | 92 | 24 | 1 | 5 | 27 | 7 | 9 | 73 | 11 | 1 : 1.8 | 70 | 2 | 100 | 19 | 86 | 3 | 14 |
| - Transport | 13 | 46 | 15 | 54 | 28 | - | 2 | 13 | 8 | 5 | 87 | 7 | 1.1 : 1 | 8 | 7 | 54 | 13 | 87 | 2 | 13 |
| - Supply | 4 | 36 | 7 | 64 | 11 | - | 1 | 14 | 3 | 3 | 86 | 4 | 1 : 1.3 | 41 | 4 | 100 | 6 | 86 | 1 | 14 |
| - Vacant posts | - | - | 4 | 100 | 4 | - | - | - | 4 | - | 100 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total (by Service) | 35 | | 74 | | 109 | 5 | 11 | | 28 | 30 | | 27 | 1 : 1.2 | 274 | 26 | | 57 | | 8 | |
| Per cent (by Service) | 32 | | 68 | | 100 | 7 | 15 | | 38 | 41 | | 47 | | | 74 | | 77 | | 11 | |
| Total (by Division) | 45 | | 189 | | 234 | 22 | 38 | | 55 | 74 | | 50 | 1 : 1.5 | 1297 | 27 | | 142 | | 79 | |
| Per cent (by Division) | 19 | | 81 | | 100 | 12 | 20 | | 29 | 39 | | 39 | | | 60 | | 75 | | 42 | |

a/ Values are based on General Service overtime submissions for January and February 1995.

b/ Staffing mix percentages (by Service and Division) are based on total staff; job description percentages (by Service and Division) are based on military and United Nations post subtotals; staffing compositions